Telemus Special Report

    | November 28, 2018


    In Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, the 18th Century philosopher speaks of the division of labor and free trade, the limits of government intervention, price discovery and the importance of the free market, all of which were theories that many believed transitioned economics to the “modern” and spawned Capitalism. Much of Smith’s work informs that which we are experiencing today in the financial markets: government intervention in the form of quantitative easing, falling interest rates, the precipitous fall of energy prices and other industrial commodities, and most recently, extreme volatility in currency values. Adam Smith explains price discovery is the natural process by which buyers and sellers solve the supply and demand equation to arrive at a “market” price. In the case of the Swiss franc, government intervention was lifted and price discovery was immediately found at a 20% uptick.

    Switzerland’s culture of bank secrecy, which dates back hundreds of years and was codified in 1934, has made Swiss banks in Geneva and Zurich safe havens for the ill-gotten wealth of “bad guys” for decades. Switzerland’s bank secrecy laws are, in no small way, responsible for this tiny country’s ability to maintain their neutrality and national sovereignty. Swiss neutrality, even through two World Wars, allowed the Swiss banking sector to thrive throughout the years. Switzerland’s central bank, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), has historically been an able steward of the country’s finances with virtually zero inflation and the legal requirement that a minimum of 40% of the total outstanding currency be backed by gold reserves. Accordingly, the Swiss franc has long been recognized as the most stable of currencies. So much so that as the Great Recession spread to a global financial crisis, worried wealth from across the globe began to migrate to the Swiss franc pushing the currency to new highs and causing worry for the export-driven Swiss economy.

    When the euro zone debt crisis developed, the Swiss franc soared in value relative to major currencies. In September of 2011 the SNB sought to mitigate the rise by fixing its currency against the euro at a rate of 1.2 Swiss. Within minutes of the SNB action, the euro, the dollar and the pound sterling appreciated 8-9% against the Swiss franc – a move that was described at the time by one experienced economist as the “single largest foreign exchange move I have ever seen.” Enforcing the franc/euro peg required the SNB to buy currencies in unlimited quantities, and so they did. Over the ensuing three years, the SNB expanded their balance sheet five-fold by printing Swiss francs to amass an ever increasing mound of euros. By 2014, this amounted to $480 billion, a sum equal to roughly 75% of Swiss GDP. Suddenly, the staid bankers of Switzerland, renowned for prudent fiscal stewardship, were huge owners of a depreciating foreign currency to which their own currency was pegged. The SNB now knows that there is a limit to unlimited quantities, and apparently the limit is $480 billion.

    The European Central Bank(ECB) announced a major quantitative easing program this week, a move that will likely drive the value of the euro even lower, and the SNB chose to capitulate to the inevitable by abandoning the franc/euro peg. Now that the Swiss franc has been unhinged from the depreciating euro, the spring-loaded value of the franc sits 18% higher than one week ago, and the Swiss stock market is 13% lower. The short term impact of the SNB decision will be problematic for the Swiss economy, but will likely be better for their economy in the long run. In the meantime, the SNB will lick their wounded reputation as they reread the writings of Adam Smith and reacquaint themselves with the free market and the process of price discovery.

    So what happens now? A combination of the coming ECB quantitative easing program and the Swiss no longer buying euros will likely further depress the value of the euro relative to most major currencies. Moreover, interest rates are likely to move lower across the board including rates that are already negative. We now have an active discourse on “negative interest rate policy,” something that has been largely theoretical and without actual practice. We do well to remember that quantitative easing on the scale seen in the US, in Japan, and soon in the EU, are monetary experiments designed to combat deflationary pressures, and the results are unknown. Financial markets like predictability, and “unknown” doesn’t reconcile with “predictable.” Accordingly, we are likely to see heightened volatility as the financial markets navigate deflationary terrain.

    We have meaningfully reduced our international exposure and have allocated assets to intermediate and longer dated treasuries, both of which help to mitigate the risks of the current environment.

    David Post

    David has been a member of the Telemus team since 2014. As the Chief Investment Officer, David formulates investment strategy and constructs portfolio model allocations for approval by the Investment Committee. David also serves as Chair of the Investment Committee and is a member of all internal research groups. David is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, and brings to Telemus more than 34 years of investment management experience serving as Founder, CEO and lead portfolio manager of investment firms serving both institutional and high net worth clients. David enjoys golf, skiing, and cycling, as well as architecture and contemporary art. He also loves to spend time with his wife, two children, and two grandchildren.

    David Post

    PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF FUTURE RESULTS. Investment decisions should always be made based on the client's specific financial needs, goals and objectives, time horizon and risk tolerance. Current and future portfolio holdings are subject to risk. Risks may include interest-rate risk, market risk, inflation risk, deflation risk, currency risk, reinvestment risk, business risk, liquidity risk, financial risk, and cybersecurity risk. These risks are more fully described in Telemus Capital's Firm Brochure (Part 2A of Form ADV), which is available upon request. Telemus Capital does not guarantee the results of any investments. Investment, insurance and annuity products are not FDIC insured, are not bank guaranteed, and may lose value.

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